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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION 
On September 11, 1998 Brett Larsen (hereafter "Appellant'') was issued a 
citation for an improper left turn and violation of the "not a drop" provision. The 
citation was issued after an investigation of a June 28, 1998 traffic collision at the 
intersection of 3800 South and Wasatch Blvd. (Record 1, hereafter "R.") 
The State originally filed two Informations, separately charging the 
Appellant with both State and County code violations. Appellant was charged 
with violating the State's Purchase, Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a 
Minor statute (Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-209); the Open Container provision 
(Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.20); and Failure to Yield the Right of Way (Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-73). (R. 14-16). In addition, the County charged Appellant 
with Negligent Collision, a violation of Salt Lake County Ordinances §11.12.090. 
(R. 6-7). The State later amended its Information to include Negligent Homicide, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206. (R. 14-16). 
On February 5, 1999, Judge Michael K. Burton presided over a bench trial 
which resulted in convictions on all four counts. (R. 3, 8, 31). On March 16, 
1999, Judge Burton sentenced the Appellant to serve the maximum jail time 
allowed for each offense, to be served consecutively. (R. 32-34, 53-55). 
Dean H. Becker, the Appellant's trial counsel, filed a notice of appeal on 
March 16, 1999, the same day of the Appellant's sentencing. (R. 50). On April 
1, 1999, Dean Becker withdrew as the Appellant's attorney and Manny Garcia 
entered his appearance of counsel. (R. 84). 
Appellant, through his attorney, made application to the Utah Court of 
Appeals to remand the case to the trial court for a determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B. This 
Court denied Appellant's 23B motion in an order dated June 15, 1999. (Utah 
Court of Appeals Docket Event Listing p. 1). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 28, 1998, at about 9:00 p.m., Douglas King (hereafter "King"), 
Kara Shinners-Little (hereafter "Shinners-Little"), and two friends were driving 
southbound on Wasatch Blvd. (Trial Transcript 112, hereafter "T."). King was 
driving a blue 1990 Subaru Legacy station wagon with Shinners-Little in the front 
passenger seat. (T. 111-2). All occupants in King's car were wearing seatbelts. 
(T. 116-7). About 200 yards from the intersection at 3800 South and Wasatch 
Blvd., King changed lanes to avoid a car which had slowed to make a turn. (T. 
113-114). King, driving 40 to 45 miles per hour, entered the intersection where 
his Subaru collided with a greenish-blue 1995 Ford Ranger light pickup truck that 
was making a westbound turn from northbound Wasatch Blvd. (T. 113, 115). 
Appellant was the driver of that Ford Ranger pickup. (T. 16-19, 22). King did 
not see the Ford Ranger until a split second before it collided with his Subaru. (T. 
115-6). King did not see the Appellant's headlights or turn signal activated. (T. 
115). Nor did King see Appellant's brake lights activate prior to the collision. 
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(T. 116). King did not have any time to take evasive action or apply his brakes 
prior to colliding with Appellant's Ford. (T. 116). King and the other two 
passengers were injured in the accident. (T. 65-6,117-8). However, King did not 
lose consciousness. (T. 116). Shinners-Little was rendered unconscious and 
ultimately died from injuries sustained in the accident. (T. 105,118). 
J. Henry Larsen, (hereafter "Larsen"), the driver of the vehicle directly 
behind the Appellant's Ford witnessed this collision from his vantage point 
directly behind Appellant in the left hand turn lane. (T. 58). Larsen saw King's 
Subaru 50 to 75 yards away approaching the intersection in the right hand lane. 
(T. 69). He estimated at trial that King's Subaru was traveling at a speed normal 
for Wasatch Blvd. (T. 71-2). Larsen saw the Appellant stop at the red light. (T. 
69). Appellant did not have his left blinker flashing. (T.58-9, 115). As far as 
Larsen could tell, Appellant's headlights were not illuminated. (T. 59). When the 
light turned green, the Appellant entered the intersection and paused for a 
moment. (T. 58, 61, 69). After pausing the Appellant commenced a left-hand 
turn at a normal rate of speed as if the intersection was clear. (T. 61). As soon as 
Larsen saw Appellant's truck venture into the intersection, he knew a collision 
was inevitable and honked his horn in warning. (T. 62). He then instructed his 
passenger to call 911. (T. 61, 63). After the collision, Larsen exited his car and 
contacted all the participants in the collision to render assistance. (T. 65-6). It 
was Larsen who positively identified Appellant as being the driver of the Ford 
Ranger pickup. (T. 67). 
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Deputy Brady Cottam, (hereafter "Cottam"), of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office, was the first officer to respond to the scene. (T. 16). He 
identified the victims and the Appellant as participants in the collision. (T. 17-8). 
Cottam also noted Appellant was 19 years old as of June 28, 1998. (T. 19). After 
initially surveying the scene and summoning a medical helicopter, Cottam spoke 
with eyewitnesses and took their statements. (T. 21-2). Cottam passed that 
information on to Deputy Clinton Johnson, (hereafter "Johnson"), a member of 
the Sheriffs Office Special Operations Division. (T. 22). 
Johnson collected witness statements and also physical evidence at the 
crash location. (T. 34). During a search of Appellant's Ford, Johnson located a 
bottle of Canadian Host whiskey with the seal broken. (T. 34-5). The whiskey 
bottle was partially empty. (T. 35). Having found this bottle, Johnson requested 
that Appellant's blood be drawn and tested for alcohol. (T. 41). Appellant's 
blood was drawn and was tested by Bruce Beck, (hereafter "Beck"), a 
toxicologist with the Utah State Health Lab. (T. 44). Using the gas 
chromatographic method to analyze the blood sample, Beck tested Appellant's 
blood for ethanol (or drinking alcohol) concentration. (T. 45,46). He reported 
the Appellant's blood contained a .009 percent level of alcohol in his blood. (T. 
46,51). 
Lawrence Stratford of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Major 
Accident Team (hereafter, "Stratford") was charged with responsibility for 
investigating the fatal June 28, 1998 crash. (T. 76,79). He found that there were 
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no skid marks that were related to this collision. (T. 83). Stratford indicated, 
however, that he could determine from yaw marks left on the road surface that the 
Appellant's wheels were still moving at the time of impact. (T. 81-5). There was 
no estimate made of the pre-impact speed of the two vehicles involved, because 
there was insufficient data at the scene to complete such a calculation1. (T. 91). 
Stratford further testified that as between two oncoming cars, one of which is 
making a left-hand turn, the car intending to go straight has the right of way and 
that the driver of the turning vehicle must yield to oncoming traffic. (T. 90). 
Lastly, Stratford testified that in the State of Utah, a person under the age of 21 is 
allowed to have zero alcohol in his/her blood. (T. 90). 
The road conditions at 3800 South and Wasatch Boulevard were typical 
for a dry summer evening. (T. 20). The intersection at 3800 South Wasatch 
Blvd. is well lit by street lamps. (T. 20). The posted speed limit on Wasatch 
Blvd. is 40 miles per hour. (T. 21). 
•' SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should summarily reject Appellant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence on the Negligent Homicide charge because Appellant 
1
 In his Statement of Relevant Facts, and again in his Argument, Appellant interjects a comment, albeit in a 
footnote, in which he claims that Appellant's mother provided trial counsel with "evidence" that the 
combined speeds of the vehicles upon impact was 120-130 miles per hour. This information was contained 
in an affidavit filed in support of Appellant's Motion to Remand under Rule 23B. As a preliminary matter, 
the "evidence" referred to amounts to triple-hearsay. No declarant is identified, and Appellant's mother 
claims to have obtained the information from a person who heard it from a claims adjuster for an unknown 
insurance company. 
In addition, Appellant's Motion to Remand under Rule 23B having been denied, the affidavits 
filed in support thereof are not a part of the record in this case. The affidavits are inadmissible in then-
entirety for purposes of this appeal. Any reference to anything contained therein should be disregarded. 
See State v. Bredehoft 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998). 
has failed to comply with the marshalling requirement. Even if this Court does 
address Appellant's sufficiency of evidence challenge on its merits, it should 
affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. The evidence at trial proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant's conduct was grossly negligent and 
was both the actual and foreseeable cause of Shinners-Little's death. 
Similarly, this Court should affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction 
on the Failure to Yield charge. Again Appellant has failed to marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. In addition, although Appellant 
asserts that Failure to Yield requires a showing of recklessness, the Utah Code is 
clear that for this offense, intent is presumed to exist if the act occurs. 
This Court should reject Appellant's claims of plain error. The Appellant 
does not provide specific examples that show the Appellant's substantial rights 
have been prejudiced. 
Finally, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's 
argument that trial counsel was ineffective is unsupported by the record. 
Appellant's ineffective assistance claims must also fail because he cannot 
demonstrate that but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON THE NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE CHARGE BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT. 
As a preliminary matter, this Court should determine whether Appellant 
has properly complied with the marshalling requirement. Appellant correctly 
recites the standard of review for a sufficiency of evidence challenge. This 
standard is derived from Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and provides that a 
trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). "In order 
to show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). The evidence 
having been properly marshaled, it falls upon the appellate court to determine 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. In so doing, this 
Court must recite and review the facts in the light most favorable to the findings 
of the trial court. Id. As the Utah Supreme Court articulated in State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), 
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making 
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate 
court under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to 
find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the 
trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
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determination. This standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear 
and the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore 
considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold 
record. Id. at 935 (Internal citations omitted). 
In the event that an appellant fails to marshal all evidence in support of the 
conviction, or demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient, the reviewing Court 
should simply refuse to address the insufficiency of evidence issue. See State v. 
Pilling. 875 P.2d 604 (Utah 1994). 
In the instant case, Appellant has failed to adequately marshal all evidence 
supporting his conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide. Although he 
characterizes his challenge as being "primarily the trial court's legal, as opposed to 
factual, reasoning" (See Brief of Appellant at page 2), he then argues at pages 10 
through 20 of his brief that the trial court relied upon insufficient evidence to 
convict. Under the circumstances, Appellant clearly bore the burden of 
marshaling the evidence in support of his conviction, yet he failed to do so. 
Specifically, Appellant fails to apprise the Court that: (1) on June 28, 1998, 
Appellant was 19 years old; (2) that following the collision which resulted in the 
death of Kara Shinners-Little, a collision to which Appellant was a party, an open 
container of Canadian Host whiskey was found in Appellant's truck; (3) that 
Appellant's blood tested positive for the presence of alcohol and that the trial court 
made a specific finding that Appellant had consumed alcohol on that occasion; (4) 
that J. Henry Larsen, from his position directly behind Appellant, observed the 
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oncoming car of Douglas King from 50-75 yards away, enough distance that as 
Appellant made his turn into the oncoming car, Larsen knew that a collision was 
inevitable, honked his horn in warning, and then instructed his passenger to dial 
911, all before the fatal collision took place; (5) that the collision occurred at 
approximately 9:00 p.m., and although it was not yet completely dark outside, it 
was dusk; (6) that neither King nor Larsen believed Appellant's headlights were 
illuminated; (7) that neither King nor Larsen saw a left turn signal operating on 
Appellant's vehicle; (8) that Deputy Johnson tested Appellant's left turn signal 
lamp and concluded that either the turn signal was not on at all or was between 
blinks at the time of the collision. In addition, the undisputed evidence at trial was 
that: (9) Douglas King had not been drinking or using any drug on the date of the 
fatal collision; (10) that he had driven that route in that car on hundreds of 
occasions and was intimately familiar with both the intersection and the vehicle; 
(11) that both of his hands were on the steering wheel; (12) that he was paying 
attention and although he may have been "mildly distracted" by conversation, any 
such distraction did not cause him to take his eyes off the road; (13) that King's 
Subaru was travelling at a reasonable speed immediately prior to the collision; 
(14) that King had no time to take evasive action or brake prior to the collision; 
(15) that King was injured in the crash but did not lose consciousness; (16) that 
Shinners-Little was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the crash. 
Not only does Appellant fail to marshal these essential components of the 
evidence supporting the conviction, he interjects into his version of the facts items 
which simply are not part of the record. For instance, on page 12 of his Brief, 
Appellant argues that "while the Subaru was obviously visible to J. Henry Larsen, 
it may not have been to Brett Larsen." And similarly, he argues that "the Subaru 
may well have come over the hill crest, and come out from the slow-moving car in 
the left land, and thus into Brett Larsen's range of view, after Larsen looked ahead 
on Wasatch Boulevard and saw the way was clear." (See Brief of Appellant at 
page 12). The State submits that such argument in the context of marshalling the 
evidence in support of the conviction is inappropriate. First and perhaps foremost, 
Appellant elected not to testify during his trial. As a result, any speculation as to 
what Appellant saw and when is just that - pure speculation. More importantly, 
this alternate version of what may have occurred on June 28, 1998, including what 
Appellant may have seen, is not a part of the record below and this Court should 
ignore it in its entirety. Secondly, Appellant should not now be permitted to argue 
the facts as they were presented at trial. The marshalling requirement compels an 
Appellant to do precisely the opposite. Such argument is akin to Appellant's 
failure in State v. Decorso, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,15 (Utah 1999), in which the 
Supreme Court chastised the appellant for "merely argu[ing] selected] portions of 
the evidence which he believes supports] his own position." Here, as in Decorso, 
Appellant utterly fails in his burden to marshal the evidence, and the evidence he 
has marshaled he disputes based upon theories and possibilities not a part of the 
record. Because Appellant has woefully failed to marshal the evidence in support 
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of his conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide, the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
In the event that this Court elects to address Appellant's insufficiency of 
evidence claim on its merits, it must next examine whether the State presented 
sufficient evidence at trial through which the trial court could have convicted the 
Appellant of Negligent Homicide. Negligent Homicide occurs when "the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-206 (1999). A person acts with criminal negligence when: 
[H]e ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviations from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1999). 
Once again, this Court must review the evidence presented at trial in the < 
light most favorable to defendant's conviction. State v. Moosman, supra. 
A. Appellant's conduct was the proximate cause of Kara Shinners-
Little's death. 
In challenging his conviction of Negligent Homicide, Appellant first 
contends that the conviction cannot be sustained because his conduct was not the { 
proximate cause of Shinners-Little's death. This claim is somewhat curious in 
light of the fact that during trial, the parties stipulated that Shinners-Little died on 
June 28, 1998, and that she died as a result of this collision. (T. 105). Not only 
does the Appellant fail to apprise the Court of this stipulation, he goes on to make 
the outrageous claim that "the relevant evidence is uncontroverted that the grossly 
negligent driving of Douglas King was the intervening proximate cause of Kara 
Skinners-Little's [sic] death." See Brief of Appellant at page 14. Not only is the 
evidence not uncontroverted as to that claim, there is simply no evidence to 
support it at all. During trial, the court allowed Appellant to pursue the notion of 
contributory negligence, over the objection of the State. (See Transcript at pages 
98-99). Trial counsel inquired of the State's accident reconstructionist as to 
possible issues of contributory negligence on the part of Douglas King. The 
Court allowed that line of questioning, indicating "I think the law does recognize 
mitigation of your duties, so yea, I think it's a relevant question." (T. 99). 
Furthermore, during closing argument, defense counsel appealed to the trial judge 
to find that Mr. King bore some responsibility for the collision. He conceded his 
client's own negligence, but went on to assert that Mr. King was as negligent or 
perhaps more so than the Appellant himself. (See Transcript at pages 128 - 132). 
Despite any evidence presented that King was contributorily negligent (and the 
State does not concede that any such evidence was presented) and despite his 
closing argument urging the trial judge to find contributory negligence on the part 
of King, the trial judge found that Appellant was criminally negligent. In so 
doing, he must have rejected the notion that any person's negligence was greater 
than Appellant's, and therefore rejected any possibility that any person other than 
Appellant had caused the victim's death. 
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In State v. Hallett 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the appellant argued at trial 
that his actions were not the proximate cause of the victim's death, an argument 
similar to the Appellant's arguments here on appeal. There, however, appellant 
argued that the victim exceeded the posted speed limit and created an intervening 
cause of death. The trial court had rejected that argument, and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed, indicating that "the evidence just referred to would not 
necessarily compel the trial court to believe that the deceased was exceeding 25 
mph" as she approached the intersection at issue. Id. at 338. Moreover, the Court 
concluded, even if she had been so speeding, "the reasonable and proper 
assumption is that if the stop sign [which the appellant had intentionally removed] 
had been there, she would have heeded it and there would have been no 
collision." Id. In the instant case, as in Hallett, there was nothing presented that 
would have compelled the trial court to conclude that Douglas King was 
negligent or in violation of any statute at the time of the collision. No one so 
testified and he was never charged with a criminal offense. Despite being 
allowed to present a contributory negligence-based argument, the defense was 
unable to overcome the evidence presented as to Appellant's criminal negligence. 
There simply was no competent evidence presented at trial that tended to show 
that King was negligent or in any way contributed to Shinners-Little's death. 
14 
It is also important to note that in Hallett, the Utah Supreme Court recited 
a third proposition - the notion that: 
[W]here a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, 
his action can properly be found to be the proximate cause of a 
resulting injury, even though later events which combined to cause 
the injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act 
is something which can reasonably be expected to follow in the 
natural sequence of events. Id. at 339. 
Like Hallett, the Appellant fails to demonstrate conclusively that King was 
speeding, passed illegally, or failed to maintain a proper lookout such that his 
conduct led to Shinners-Little's death. King had the right of way through the 
intersection and the Appellant failed to yield that right of way to King. Even 
assuming that the Appellant's factual representations are true, King's conduct 
does not diminish or absolve the Appellant of his statutory duty to yield to 
oncoming traffic. See State v. Busbv, 102 Utah 416 (Utah 1942) ("Even if the 
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, if the defendant was guilty of 
criminal negligence . . . and such negligence caused or contributed to the death, 
the fact that the decedent himself may have been guilty of negligence which also 
contributed, would not excuse the defendant.") 
B. The death of Shinners-Little was a foreseeable consequence of 
Appellant's conduct. 
If this Court determines that Appellant's conduct was the proximate cause 
of the victim's death, it must then analyze whether that death was a foreseeable 
consequence of Appellant's conduct. The State once again invites this Court's 
attention to State v. Hallett, supra. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court provides 
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a sort of blueprint for analyzing cases involving criminal negligence. The Court 
first announces that "proximate cause is the cause which through its natural and 
foreseeable consequence, unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, produces 
the injury which would not have occurred but for that cause." Id. At 338. The 
State has already addressed the issue of actual cause, as well as the absence of 
any sufficient intervening cause. What remains is whether Shinners-Little's death 
was a foreseeable consequence of Appellant's negligence. 
It is undisputed that the law of the instant case is that Appellant, in making 
his left hand turn, was obligated to yield when an approaching vehicle 
"constitute^] an immediate hazard." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1998). The 
Utah Supreme Court has placed a burden on the driver "making the turn as he has 
control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement 
cannot be made in safety then the disfavored driver should yield." French v. Utah 
Oil Ref. Co.. 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Utah 1950)(emphasis added). The question is 
whether, in failing to so yield, Appellant should have foreseen a fatal collision. 
Appellant contends that he should not be held accountable for the death of 
Shinners-Little because her death was not a foreseeable consequence of his 
conduct. Again Appellant seeks to retreat behind the notion that King was 
somehow more accountable for her death than Appellant himself. In so doing, 
Appellant yet again argues the facts as presented at trial rather than portraying 
them in the light most favorable to the conviction. What the Appellant may or 
may not have seen or done on the evening of this fatal collision will never be 
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known because he elected not to testify at his trial. In so doing, he left this Court 
with a record consisting of only one version of the facts - the version presented 
by the State. 
In Hallett, appellant advanced a similar "foreseeability" argument. And 
therein, the argument failed, as it should in the instant case. The Hallett Court 
noted that "the defendant could not fail to know that stop signs are placed at 
particular intersections where they are deemed to be necessary because of special 
hazards; and that without the stop sign, the hazards which caused it to be placed 
there would exist; and that he should have foreseen that is removal would result 
in setting a trap fraught with danger and possible fatal consequences to others." 
Hallet, 619 P.2d at 338. The State submits that these words ring as true today as 
they did when they were written nearly 20 years ago. Certainly Appellant does 
not contend that he was not aware of the function of a traffic light, and he is 
charged with the knowledge of and responsibility to obey traffic laws as an 
operator of a motor vehicle in the State of Utah. It seems hard to imagine that a 
19 year-old driver would assert that he was unaware that his disregard of traffic 
signals and laws would lead to collisions with other vehicles, and to possible 
injuries and/or death. Appellant made no such claim at trial and indeed to have 
done so would have been ludicrous. Certainly a reasonable person in Appellant's 
position would have recognized the danger. Witness J. Henry Larsen, whom the 
trial court characterized as the "ordinary person," (T. 64), testified as to his 
conduct when he approaches an intersection and intends to turn left. And he 
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elaborated on the reasons for taking extra precautions at that time. (T. 64). This 
representative "ordinary person" essentially articulated the reasoning behind the 
"Failure to Yield" statute, and the importance of compliance therewith. If the 
"ordinary man," upon whom the criminal negligence standard is dependent, was 
aware of the risks, Appellant is presumed to have been similarly aware. Because 
the State proved that the "ordinary person" would have perceived the risks of 
failing to yield to an oncoming vehicle, that same knowledge should be imputed 
to Appellant. When viewed from the perspective of the reasonable driver, 
Shinners-Little's death was clearly foreseeable. 
C. Appellant was criminally negligent 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that Kara Shinners-Little was 
killed as a proximate and foreseeable result of Appellant's conduct, it must last 
consider whether Appellant's conduct rose to the level of criminal negligence. 
Relevant law provides that a person acts with criminal negligence when he "ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
that the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's viewpoint." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4). The facts as presented at trial 
clearly provide ample support for the trial court's finding of criminal negligence. 
This Court should not disturb that finding unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
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been made. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988); State v. Gum 
904 P. 2d 238, 2241 (Utah App. 1995); Spanish Fork City v. Brvan. 975 P. 2d 
501, 502 (Utah App. 1999). 
In arguing that he was not criminally negligent, Appellant once again 
relies upon an interpretation of the facts which finds no support in the record. His 
argument is entirely dependent upon phrases like "it would have been legally 
permissible to recognize" that Appellant was negligent but not criminally so, and 
that a finding of criminal negligence is impermissible where it "is unclear that a 
reasonable person in Larsen's position would even have seen the Subaru prior to 
the collision." (Brief of Appellant at 18-19). A review of the evidence when 
presented in the light most favorable to the conviction reveals that the trial court 
rejected the notion that Appellant had committed only simple negligence. In 
announcing the verdicts at trial, the court explained that "Mr. Brett Larsen's 
actions today, due to these facts, has to be a gross deviation. Essentially, he 
drove into the intersection, turned left, and made no perceptive view of the 
oncoming traffic." (T. 139). The trial court made specific factual findings that 
(1) Appellant intended to turn left at the intersection in question; (2) that he failed 
to yield to an oncoming vehicle which was so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard; (3) that at the time of the collision Appellant was carrying an open 
container of an alcoholic beverage, the contents of which was partially removed, 
in his vehicle; (4) that Appellant was under 21 years of age at the time of the 
collision; (5) that Appellant had consumed alcohol on that occasion. (T. 137-138). 
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The trial court also found that the oncoming vehicle of Douglas King was visible, 
given that witness Henry Larsen testified to having seen it from some distance. 
(T. 138). Lastly, the court found that Appellant had made no effort to stop prior 
to the collision, as indicated by the testimony that his tires were still moving after 
the collision. (T. 138). After correctly reciting the legal standard, and having 
made specific factual findings, the court announced that "it's clear to me that this 
is a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person has to 
exercise." (T. 139). 
It is patently clear that, when reviewing the properly marshaled evidence 
in the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence presented at trial was 
more than sufficient to sustain a conviction on the charge of Negligent Homicide. 
This Court should summarily affirm the trial court's judgment as Appellant has 
failed to marshal all evidence in support of conviction. Even if this Court 
determines to analyze Appellant's claim on the merits, it must fail because the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
POINT II. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF FAILURE TO YIELD 
THE RIGHT OF WAY. 
The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain Appellant's 
conviction for failure to yield. The State must prove the Appellant failed to "yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is 
so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard." Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-73 (1998). The testimony presented at trial in conjunction with the 
circumstances of the actual accident show that King's car was "so close" to the 
Appellant's vehicle that it was an "immediate threat." 
Furthermore, the State is not required to prove intent in connection with an 
allegation of failure to yield. The failure to yield statute is a part of the Motor 
Vehicle Code enacted by the Utah Legislature. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that "one who violates provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code] is presumed to 
intend the natural consequences of his [or her] violation." Greaves v. State, 528 
P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974). Pursuant to that case, intent is presumed, and 
therefore the State does not need to show any more than the consequences of the 
violation. Appellant urges this Court to find that the State was required to prove 
his recklessness in connection with the Failure to Yield charge. However, such is 
not the law in the State of Utah, and the State should not be compelled to so prove. 
The trial court, as illustrated above, made specific factual findings having heard 
the evidence and argument, and those findings should not be disturbed under these 
circumstances. Because the State has proven that Appellant failed to yield to King 
and no evidence is need to prove intent, the Appellant's conviction for failure to 
yield should be affirmed. 
POINT III. THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR. 
To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must establish that an obvious 
and harmful error occurred which prejudiced the Appellant's substantial rights. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert denied 493 U.S. 814 (1989)). 
In the present case, no decision of the trial court prejudiced the Appellant's 
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substantial rights. Appellant apparently mistakes the trial court's rejection of his 
theories as plain error. However, the Appellant fails to cite any specific instance 
in which the trial court or Appellant's counsel impeded Appellant's ability to 
present his case or prejudiced any other substantial right. Furthermore, even 
assuming that there was an error, the Appellant cannot show that the "error" would 
have resulted in a different outcome. The trial court's findings and orders 
concerning the negligent homicide and the failure to yield are supported by 
evidence presented at trial and do not constitute a plain error. 
POINT IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE. 
This Court has previously addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, at least in part. Appellant moved for remand to the trial court for a 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
23B. This Court denied that motion based upon Appellant's failure to allege 
sufficient nonspeculative facts which would tend to indicate ineffectiveness on the 
part of counsel. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant must satisfy 
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That 
test states: 
First, the Appellant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the 
Appellant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the Appellant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
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the Appellant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 
687. 
Therefore, the Appellant must first show that his trial counsel's 
performance was below objectively reasonable standards of representation. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d516, 521 (Utah 1994). cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 
(1994). 
Appellant's contention that his trial counsel failed to raise obvious 
insufficiency of evidence issues regarding the negligent homicide blatantly 
disregards his trial counsel's conduct during the course of the trial. The 
Appellant's trial counsel vigorously cross-examined each of the State's witnesses 
in an attempt to bolster his alternative theories regarding the accident. 
Furthermore, the Appellant's trial counsel in closing arguments moved for 
dismissal of the negligent homicide charge for failure to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Appellant acted with the requisite intent to commit the 
crime. (T. 132). The fact that the trial court simply disagreed with the defense's 
theory of the case cannot reasonably be imputed to defense counsel. In short, 
defense counsel should not be labeled "ineffective" based solely upon an 
unfavorable outcome for his client. Based on trial counsel's actions during the 
trial, the Appellant fails to show that his trial counsel's "performance was 
deficient." 
The second part of the Strickland test analyzes whether "there is a 
reasonable probability that 'but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of 
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the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 
(Utah App. 1993)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Assuming that the 
Appellant's trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to raise the 
insufficiency of evidence issue with respect to the intent element on the Failure to 
Yield charge, the outcome would have been the same because intent is presumed 
for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 
1974). The evidence presented at trial was uncontroverted that the Appellant 
failed to yield to oncoming traffic that constituted an immediate hazard. Because 
the outcome of the trial would not have been different even if trial counsel had 
raised the issues now urged by Appellant, his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails on both negligent homicide and failure to yield. 
On appeal, Appellant speculates that had trial counsel done things 
differently, Appellant would have been acquitted. However, merely speculating 
that "there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different" 
does not make it so. (Appellant's Brief at 24). "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. As the State has clearly demonstrated herein, it presented at trial 
sufficient evidence on each offense charged, and secured convictions only after the 
trial judge made a careful review of all of the evidence and listened to argument 
from both parties. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 
succeed because he is unable to demonstrate to this Court that an acquittal on any 
charge would have resulted had trial counsel's performance been different. 
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Therefore, this Court should reject Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that Appellant's convictions of Negligent 
Homicide and Failure to Yield the Right of Way be summarily affirmed based 
upon Appellant's failure to properly marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
convictions. In the alternative, the State requests that following an analysis of 
Appellant's claims on their merits, the convictions be affirmed. The evidence and 
relevant law as applied to that evidence demonstrates that Appellant's convictions 
of negligent homicide and failure to yield are justified and grounded with 
sufficient support. The Appellant has failed to meet the burden necessary to 
overcome factual question decided in a bench trial. Furthermore, the Appellant 
has not sufficiently shown any evidence of plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Appellant's 
convictions for Negligent Homicide and Failure to Yield be affirmed. 
plh 
Dated this 0_ day of November, 1999 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-12. Violations of chapter-Penalties. 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, 
unless otherwise provided. 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 15, and 17 of this chapter 
is an infraction, unless otherwise provided. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-
of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so 
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102. Culpable mental state required - Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof 
of any culpable mental state. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; 
and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206. Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting 
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state 
or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except 
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 23 B. Motion to remand for findings necessary 
to determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of 
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon 
a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the 
filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to 
be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court 
from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if 
the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a 
party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record 
on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by 
the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion 
shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, 
unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any 
reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall 
identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to 
each such claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also 
direct the trial court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days 
of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of 
good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct 
that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed 
or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other 
procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for 
remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of 
the parties or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require 
consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. 
Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as 
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the 
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the 
evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the 
claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice 
suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand. 
Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the 
order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental 
proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of 
the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. 
If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been 
transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the 
record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire 
record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other 
appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable 
under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
